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Abstract
This article considers the processes in the illicit online prescription drug trade, namely search-redir-
ection attacks and the operation of unlicensed pharmacies using crime script analysis. Empirical data
have been used to describe the salient elements of the online criminal infrastructures and associated
monetization paths enabling criminal profitability. This analysis reveals the existence of structural
chokepoints: components of online criminal operations being limited in number, and critical for the
operations’ profitability. Consequently, interventions targeting such components can reduce the
opportunities and incentives to engage in online crime through an increase in criminal operational
costs, and in the risk of apprehension.
Key words: online prescription drug trade; illicit online pharmacies; search-redirection attacks; crime script analysis; situational
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Introduction
In this article, we examine two key processes of the illicit online pre-
scription trade that allow this trade to be profitable [1], through crime
script analysis (CSA) [2]. CSA involves outlining the consequential steps
and actions undertaken in order to prepare for, undertake, and complete
a certain offence or offence type. Scripts represent knowledge structures
that allow for the organization of thoughts or understanding of events
or social interactions, including crime [3]. We then use the derived crime
script to identify appropriate situational crime prevention countermeas-
ures that could be capable of disrupting the illicit online activity. The
two processes we examine are: (i) one of the abusive advertising vectors
widely employed in the trade for many years called search-redirection
attack [1]; and (ii) the operation of illicit online pharmacies [web stores
that focus primarily on the trade of drugs without necessarily abiding to
the legal requirements (e.g. licensing, requirement for prescriptions) of
operating such store in the countries of their customers].
While our rationale for examining the illicit online pharmacies
through CSA is rather straightforward given their role in monetizing
this illicit activity, the decision to focus on the specific advertising
vector—the search-redirection attack—is based on its extent and im-
pact [4]. This type of attack allows certain visitors to compromised
websites (which are under the control of an adversary with or with-
out the knowledge of the legitimate owner)—those who come to
such websites after searching for certain keywords—to be redirected
to online stores selling pharmaceutical drugs without a prescription.
All other visitors, including the compromised websites’ owners, see
only the original sites. Consequently, such compromises have been
proven to be long-lived [1], and add to the confusion related to the
legitimacy of online pharmacies [5].
Our work is predominantly focused on the criminal activity asso-
ciated with the illicit online prescription drug trade due to its soci-
etal impact. By enabling access to prescription drugs without a valid
prescription and without proper health assessment by a medical doc-
tor, consumers are essentially allowed to self-medicate. This practice
is a dangerous one as it can lead to severe health issues [6].
However, the aspect of appropriate deterrents—which is a necessary
aspect of a discussion on remediation—is equally interesting and im-
portant. Looking at the drug trafficking problem primarily from the
US legal perspective—both online and offline—laws and statutes are
rather adequate to persecute and punish offenders [7]. However,
laws are limited in their ability to cover the international aspects of
the online prescription drug trade, and the coordinated efforts to
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police these markets are not temporally persistent and consistent [8].
Consequently, it is highly uncertain whether an offender will be pun-
ished for illicitly trading prescription drugs online. The inadequacy
in enforcing existing laws on the Internet questions the certainty of
punishment, invalidating a fundamental assumption of general de-
terrence. Indeed, according to Beccaria, the certainty of being pun-
ished when committing a crime is a necessary condition to prevent
other from committing similar activities [9].
Our approach toward addressing this inadequacy in this work is
straightforward. We use CSA to identify the structural chokepoints
in the trade of illicit prescription drugs, outlining a holistic approach
toward disrupting this illicit online market. The structural choke-
points are those parts of the script that are critical for the operation
of the illicit enterprise. By applying intervention measures at struc-
tural chokepoints, we argue it is plausible to increase the effective-
ness of the disruption method.
Impact of online pharmacies on public health
The operation of unlicensed pharmacies is not just a legal or regula-
tory issue, but also leads to social and public health problems.
Independent testing has revealed that the drugs sold through these
pharmacies often include the active ingredient, but often in incorrect
and potentially dangerous dosages [10, 11]. Henney et al. [6] and
Henney [12] show that, despite the convenience provided by online
pharmacies (e.g. 24-h availability), they often do not follow due dili-
gence in issuing prescriptions, or they forfeit this requirement alto-
gether. Moreover, by providing access to unapproved drugs,
unlicensed online pharmacies put the health of their customers at
risk. Bessell et al. [13, 14] studied the pharmacological information
of prescription and over-the-counter drugs advertised at internation-
ally based online pharmacies. They found that the information was
usually inappropriate, insufficient, or nonexistent, making the use of
those products unsafe. A systematic review by Orizio et al. [15] simi-
larly found a lack of or inappropriate information and labeling of
drugs, particularly relating to side effects, that were sold through on-
line pharmacies.
As the health risks associated with unlicensed online pharmacies
are apparent, we would expect their market penetration to be minimal.
However, the high costs of health care and health insurance in the
USA makes them a high-risk alternative for low-income customers [16].
Unlicensed online pharmacies also attract customers of higher socioe-
conomic status, who can afford health care costs, but are instead inter-
ested in abusing prescription drugs for recreation [17]. In addition,
unlicensed online pharmacies are not easily distinguishable from their
legitimate counterparts. Ivanitskaya et al. [5] found that undergraduate
students, even ones enrolled in health-related studies, could not easily
identify illicit online pharmacies as such.
Legal and regulatory approaches to online pharmacies
in the USA
Considering the US-focused context of our work, we briefly examine
the regulatory framework in the USA pertaining to drugs. The
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, and
especially Title II, the Controlled Substances Act, is the core piece of
federal legislation regulating the drug market. Drugs are classified into
“Schedules” according to potency for abuse and dangers of misuse. It
regulates how drugs enter the market, how they are sold (after a phys-
ical examination, with a prescription, etc.), and imported. In 2008 the
Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act was passed,
extending the Controlled Substances Act to regulate online pharmacies
explicitly. Online pharmacies must have an associated physical “brick-
and-mortar” pharmacy licensed in each state that it operates, and can-
not sell, or claim to sell, prescription drugs without a prescription.
Furthermore, issuing a prescription for the first time requires a phys-
ical in-person examination.
However, the problem of international pharmacies shipping their
merchandise to the USA remains. This issue is compounded by the
low prices of prescription drugs abroad [18], which create incentives
for US-based customers to purchase their medication over the
Internet. Other legislative efforts have tried to address different as-
pects of the problem of illicit online prescription drugs, albeit unsuc-
cessfully (e.g. the Internet Prescription Drug Consumer Protection
Act of 2000, Safe Online Drug Act of 2004, Pharmaceutical Market
Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, Internet Drug Sales
Accountability Act of 2005, Safe Internet Pharmacy Act of 2007,
and Safeguarding America’s Pharmaceuticals Act of 2008). Internet
and pharmaceutical industries have joined forces to self-regulate un-
licensed pharmacies through accreditation, verification, and reputa-
tion programs [19–21]. Unlicensed pharmacies have been barred
from purchasing Google AdWords since 2003 [22]. LegitScript [23],
an online service that provides a list of law-abiding pharmacies, is
reportedly used by Google and Microsoft to determine whether
pharmacies are legitimate [24]. The National Association of Boards
of Pharmacy provides accreditation, for a fee, to law-abiding online
pharmacies, as well as an extensive list of “not recommended” on-
line pharmacies, which fail to demonstrate that they abide to the
law of their jurisdiction [25].
Other online verification programs do exist, which aim to assist
consumers in making informed choices. Their stringency varies and
range from requiring valid pharmacy licenses in the USA or Canada
(e.g. pharmacychecker.com) to mere reputation forums (e.g. phar-
macyreviewer.com). However, because of the large number of on-
line pharmacies, many pharmacies are neither accredited or
licensed, nor blacklisted. For instance, eupillz.com, an online phar-
macy selling prescription drugs in 2013, did not appear at the time
in any of the aforementioned databases.
Policing online pharmacies
In the USA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) oversees the
safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics. The FDA has established co-
operation with other federal agencies, namely the Department of
Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and
the Postal Inspection Service [26]. The FDA recognized—as early as
2001—the significant complexities in investigating and enforcing
policies relating to online pharmacies [12]. The FDA’s efforts have
focused on the shutdown of the illicit web stores, rather than on the
identification of the structures that enable their operation. Examples
of such operations are Cyber Chase [27] and Cyber X [28].
However, considering the extent of the problem and the significant
duration of those law enforcement operations, the outcomes are
usually underwhelming, highlighting the shortcomings of current en-
forcement mechanisms [8].
In the international arena, Interpol coordinates a series of oper-
ations to raise awareness and to identify the criminals engaging in
the online prescription drug trade. Operation Pangea is an annual
week-long operation with a large number of participating
countries—a total of 111 participated in 2014—that enables coordi-
nated action across many jurisdictions. Operations Mamba, Storm,
and Cobra are in the same spirit as Pangea, but have regional focus
(Eastern Africa, Southeast Asia, and Western Africa, respectively)
and last longer (on average, one month; Storm I lasted five months)
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[29]. Most importantly, the effects of these operations are short
lived [8], and website takedown often ineffective as the online phar-
macy can displace to other compromised hosts [30]. The efforts of
enforcement need to be persistent for the effects to be long term.
Other efforts are subject to significant limitations due to a lack
of international coordination. Operations targeting illicit sales of
prescription drugs from international marketplaces depend on the
capability to properly identify and examine packages at the port of
entry. However, the immense number of packages arriving in the
USA, and the limited capabilities for inspections by the US CBP,
allow a potentially significant amount of illicit drugs to reach US-
based customers [31, 32]. Even in cases with no jurisdictional issues
to prosecute offenders residing abroad, the FDA depends on the for-
eign countries to take action against the wrongdoer [33].
Advertising illicit online pharmacies through
search-redirection attacks
Online criminals interested in illicitly advertising products sold
through web stores have been changing their methods through the
years to achieve higher conversion rates. For example, due the small
conversion rate of spam email (realized sales over emails sent), the
miscreants started employing Twitter spam, which exploited peo-
ple’s trust to their online social network [34]. In addition, those
advertising unlicensed pharmacies have also had to turn to innova-
tive methods after being barred from legitimately advertising
through search engines such as Google. “Search-redirection at-
tacks,” whereby web servers are compromised to manipulate web
search results that promote the unauthorized sale of prescription
drugs, are an example of such innovation. In this attack, traffic is
dynamically redirected to different pharmacies based upon the par-
ticular search terms issued by the consumer. As the advertised site
has at least a degree of relevance to the query issued, the conversion
rate is much higher than for spam [1].
Figure 1 illustrates the attack. In this example, the top two re-
sults obtained for the query “cheap viagra” are compromised web-
sites. The top result is the website of a news center affiliated with a
university. The site was compromised to include a pharmacy store-
front in a hidden directory. Clicking on any of the links in that store-
front sends the prospective customer to pillsforyou24.com, a known
rogue Internet pharmacy [23].
In search-redirection attacks, the website has been compromised,
an act deemed as illegal in many countries. The compromised web-
site redirects to content controlled by the offenders only when the
search engine query matches what the attacker would like to dis-
play, in this example, advertisements for cheap Viagra. All other re-
quests, including typing the web address directly into a browser,
return the original content of the website. Therefore, website oper-
ators cannot readily discern that their website has been compro-
mised. As a result of this “cloaking” mechanism, some of the victim
sites remain infected for a long time [1].
Situational crime prevention and crime displacement
Clarke and Cornish’s [35] perspective of “rational choices” in the
criminal decision-making process provides a systematic approach
for crime prevention. According to rational choice theory, offenders
calculate the perceived costs and benefits of crime while seeking
some type of advantage from their actions [36]. Choice structuring
properties include the availability of tools, time, skills, and expert-
ise, as well as the location of the target and the ease in which the
crime can be committed undetected. Clarke and Cornish [35] ob-
serve criminal behavior as the “outcome of the offender’s rational
choices and decisions,” and not as an effect of personal or societal
dispositions. Therefore, crime prevention should focus on reducing
criminal opportunity in the environments that are conducive toward
crime.
Given this purposeful, procedural, and rational nature of crime,
Clarke and Cornish [35] provide an analytic framework for crime
Figure 1. Example of a search-redirection attack. The first two results returned here are sites that have been compromised to advertise unlicensed
pharmacies [4].
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prevention, by placing the focus on the different stages of criminal
events. The availability of opportunities plays a key role in criminal
events, and by modifying the situation in which crime occurs, such
as by installing physical barriers or improving lighting, crime may
be prevented [37]. Situational crime prevention is not limited to
physical locations, but is transferrable to crime that occurs online
[38]. Situational crime prevention approaches are crime specific,
requiring close attention to the associated situational factors. For ex-
ample, there may be separate, but overlapping, models for website
compromise, where the intent is to manipulate search engine results,
as opposed to website defacement.
A common concern in relation to crime reduction techniques
through situational prevention measures is what happens to the net
amount of criminal activity deflected through such measures—i.e.
the “displacement effects” [36, 39]. Indeed, there are various types
of crime displacement that may occur after an intervention. For ex-
ample, criminals can alter (i) the location, (ii) the temporal charac-
teristics, (iii) the individual targets, and (iv) their techniques in
committing their crime, or even (v) switch to a completely different
criminal activity altogether [39, 40]. Indeed, the use of search-
redirection attacks to advertise unlicensed pharmacies is an example
of how techniques in committing a crime have changed in response
to policy implementation. In this case, Google prevented offenders
from advertising unlicensed pharmacies in a legitimate way, which
may be one factor leading to the compromise of web servers for the
purpose of illicit advertisements.
Modeling offenders’ decisions using CSA
“CSA” extends the rational choice approach, using the notion of
“scripts” from cognitive psychology [3]. It is a systematic frame-
work for breaking down and examining the criminal process, and
mapping situational prevention measures to every step of crime
commission. In addition, crime scripts are useful in identifying the
most significant steps of criminal operations (i.e. chokepoints) that
can be targeted with more intense or persistent measures.
There are a number of studies that use CSA to understand crim-
inal cases in mostly the physical [41–45], but also in the digital, do-
main [46–48]. In particular, Lavorgna [48] uses CSA to examine the
trade in counterfeit drugs. While the focus was on drugs sold online,
the developed script did not focus on the electronic aspects of the
trade, other than noting that this is where the drugs were advertised
and ordered. In addition, the crime prevention recommendations are
limited to awareness raising and consumer education, while noting
that technology may also play a role [48]. By examining these tech-
nical aspects in more depth, we further develop the work by
Lavorgna [48] to identify what these technical countermeasures
could be.
CSA is particularly useful when it comes to informing situational
countermeasures. At a high level, Levi and Maguire [43] and Savona
[49] show the importance of using situational measures to fight
organized crime through crime scripts. Morselli and Roy [44] exam-
ine two stolen-vehicle exportation operations through CSA, identify-
ing key brokers whose removal would result in a significant
disruption to the underground market. While these crime types take
place in the physical world, the idea that key brokers and choke-
points for intervention could have implications for other actors and
steps involved in the crime commission process is also highly rele-
vant to crime in the online environment.
Willison [46] examines a case of insider threat in computer-
related crime, where a city employee accessed the city’s financial sys-
tems to create fraudulent invoices. The crime script examines the
various actions that allowed the criminal to be successful, and situ-
ational measures to prevent future occurrences of the specific crime
are outlined. Hutchings and Holt [47] use CSA to understand the
economy based around the market for stolen goods. This economy
includes the sale of tools and services to steal data, the buying and
selling of the data itself, the transferring of data into currency such
as the sale of plastics and the advertising of drop services to receive
card-not-present fraudulent purchases, and money laundering ser-
vices. Chiu et al. [41] examine illicit drug manufacturing labs using
data from transcripts of 30 Australian courts. Using information
from the transcripts to build a crime script, they characterize (i) the
manufacturing and storage locations, (ii) the resources used (i.e.
chemicals and equipment), and (iii) the actions and interactions
among the various actors. Finally, they identify measures for effect-
ive intervention at every step of the crime commission process,
organized by location, target, and offender involvement.
An examination of online criminal processes to
formulate disincentives
We now take a structured approach, informed by the empirical ana-
lyses by Leontiadis et al. [1, 50], to examine the crime scripts for the
illicit online pharmaceutical trade, and to understand the processes
enabling their operation and profitability. Considering the consider-
able reliance of our work on previous measurement studies, we
briefly examine the methodologies used in the cited work.
Methods
Leontiadis et al. [1] gathered data for 218 prescription drug-related
search terms every day for nine months. Over 7000 compromised
web servers redirected visitors to a few hundred online pharmacies,
to the detriment of legitimate pharmacies and websites providing
health resources. This work not only provided an initial assessment
of the problem, but it also empirically mapped the criminal online
infrastructure and operation, which is critical for the construction of
crime scripts.
The authors also considered the possibility that the potential
measurement biases imposed through query selection biases would
affect their findings. However, they were able to invalidate this hy-
pothesis by running a comparative analysis between their primary
set of 218 queries and two additional—much more extensive—sets
of queries.
In their later work, Leontiadis et al. [50] collected inventory and
pricing data over a period of six months on 256 unlicensed online
pharmacies identified as advertising through search-redirection at-
tacks. In essence, the authors continued the daily execution of the
218 queries, identifying the unlicensed pharmacies at the end of the
redirections chains. Then for each of those pharmacies identified
daily, they scraped the complete content, feeding it into a custom-
made parser capable of extracting information on the advertised
drugs. Related information includes (i) brand names, (ii) active in-
gredients, (iii) dosages, (iv) number of units per package, and (v) pri-
ces. Using this information, Leontiadis et al. were able to derive
structural characteristics of this illicit online ecosystem, such as pric-
ing and inventory selection strategies.
Overall, using the empirical data availed through the aforemen-
tioned research, we are able to derive crime scripts. These scripts are
then mapped to situational crime prevention measures capable of
disrupting the criminal operations, including decreasing the profit-
ability, and increasing the risks.
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CSA scenes in the illicit online prescription drug trade
The two key components that enable the illicit online pharmaceut-
ical trade are: (i) the illicit advertising, namely search-redirection at-
tacks, responsible for driving potential customers (i.e. web traffic) to
the unlicensed online pharmacies and (ii) the unlicensed pharmacy,
which is the process responsible for monetizing the received web
traffic.
In the context of CSA, the two processes are termed “scenes,” and
we list their key sub-processes (termed “script actions”) in Fig. 2. We
note that while the two processes function independently, they should
be considered as complementary to each other. The output of the illicit
advertising is used as the input for the pharmacy operation, and we in-
dicate this “communication” with a dotted arrow in Fig. 2. The com-
plementary nature is evident when considering the multitude of uses
for the hijacked web traffic. For example, the same traffic can be dir-
ected to other illicit online markets and to websites that can potentially
infect their visitors with malware. Similarly, unlicensed online phar-
macies can attract potential customers though means, such as email
spam [34, 51], and organic search results [4].
Script actions for search-redirection attacks
Search-redirection attacks can be used to direct potential customers to
illicit online pharmacies. This crime script allows for a detailed ana-
lysis of the criminal procedures. The search-redirection attack works
in five steps. Initially, the criminals (i) identify vulnerable websites,
and they (ii) compromise them by injecting malicious code altering the
functionality of those websites. The compromised websites then (iii)
manipulate search engines into associating the compromised websites
with drug-related terms, even if these terms are completely irrelevant
to the original content of those websites, (iv) hijack incoming traffic
originating from search engine results, and (v) redirect web traffic to
online pharmacies, often through one or more “traffic brokers.” We
now examine each of the five steps of the criminal process, identifying
the commonly employed criminal methods.
Identifying vulnerable websites
Online criminals mainly employ scanners and search engines to iden-
tify vulnerable websites or hosting providers [52–54]. Through both
methods, attackers look for specific characteristics of the hosting oper-
ating systems, web servers, and web content that are exploitable,
allowing them to gain unauthorized access. The motivation behind the
use of these techniques is the reduction of criminal operational costs.
They are automated and capable of identifying a large portion of po-
tential victims at low marginal cost. Floreˆncio and Herley [55] discuss
the validity of this threat model from an economic perspective, show-
ing that online criminal operations need to be effective at a large scale.
However, while Floreˆncio and Herley [55] associate the reduction of
expected criminal gains with the “sum-of-efforts” of defenders, this ar-
gument is not applicable in this case, due to the well-known vulnerable
state of these websites. If the argument was applicable, reducing the
number of vulnerable websites would actually increase the risk of vic-
timization for those remaining [56]. The process of identifying vulner-
able websites is precise in nature, as it reveals the websites that are
known to lack the required defenses [54]. We may therefore assume
that the majority of vulnerable websites identified with the aforemen-
tioned techniques are eventually compromised.
Compromising vulnerable websites
Methods of compromise become more sophisticated as they adapt
to deployed countermeasures; however, the characteristics of com-
promised websites (i.e. the targets of criminals) are similar across
time. Vasek and Moore [57] examine the risk factors that correlate
Identify vulner-
able websites
Compromise vul-
nerable websites
Manipulate
search engines
Hijack acquired
web traﬃc
Redirect traﬃc
Identify drug suppliers
Select drugs for sale
Deﬁne pricing strategy
Deploy phar-
macy website
Receive web traﬃc
Process payments
Ship merchandise
Illicit advertising
Pharmacy operation
Figure 2. Components of the crime commission process in the illicit online prescription drug trade.
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with a website being vulnerable to compromise and used for search
redirection. Factors positively correlated with search-redirection at-
tacks included running a Content Management Software (CMS) sys-
tem (an application that simplifies the publication and editing of
web content, examples include Joomla and WordPress [51]), partic-
ularly one that is popular, often exploitable, and out of date.
Another risk factor is the website being hosted on a specific set of
server types. In the same context, Soska and Christin [58] demon-
strate a highly automated method to predict if a website will be com-
promised within a one-year horizon, based on an adaptive set of
extracted features, with a recall rate of 66%. Another characteristic
of compromised websites is their ranking (i.e. position) in search re-
sults. As the compromised websites inherit the popularity of the in-
fected domains, online criminals have the incentive to specifically
target vulnerable websites with high ranking, such as educational
websites under the.EDU top level domain, so that they appear at the
top of the search results [1].
Once these requirements for compromise have been met, the mis-
creants use tools available online, such as Metasploit [59], to deploy
their attack, taking control of the vulnerable websites, and injecting
their malicious code. Within the scope of a search-redirection attack,
this malicious code manipulates search engine results, and hijacks
the web traffic directed to the compromised websites.
Manipulating search engine results
One of the two key “responsibilities” of a compromised website is
to manipulate the search engine crawlers into associating the legit-
imate-but-compromised website with drug-related queries.
Examining the methods for accomplishing this goal, Leontiadis
et al. [1] identified two prevalent techniques: “cloaking” and “phar-
macy storefront injection.” Cloaking is the act of serving substan-
tially different web content, depending on the characteristics of the
requestor. In the case of a search-redirection attack, the compro-
mised website can detect the presence of a search engine crawler
(which crawls the web and retrieves the content of websites, which
are then associated with search queries), and provide a version of
the compromised website that is filled with drug-related terms and
links to other compromised websites (an act termed as “link farm-
ing” [60]). However, when the request is initiated from a non-
crawler entity (i.e. normal web traffic), the compromised server ei-
ther (i) presents the original content of the compromised website to
avoid detection, or (ii) redirects the traffic to a different web loca-
tion under the control of the attackers. The exact behavior is de-
pendent on the variant of injected malware, and is often triggered
using the information in the referrer field of the HTTP request.
A relatively new variant of the search-redirection attack injects a
pharmacy storefront on an attacker-defined location within the
compromised web server. In this case, the web server presents the il-
licit content regardless of the referrer information. This approach re-
duces the risks, and increases the benefits, to the attackers in two
ways. First, it does not involve cloaking, a tactic that is usually
against the terms of use of search engines [61–63]. Therefore, the
chances of being the focus of a search engine intervention are lower
than with the previous method. Second, it overcomes a deployed
countermeasure that involves hiding the referrer information when a
request originates from a search result page. This piece of informa-
tion has been the cornerstone for previous attack variants, and with-
holding it nullifies the effects of the attack. However, by injecting a
pharmacy storefront, online criminals effectively overcome the de-
ployed countermeasures [50].
Traffic hijacking
The second “responsibility” of a compromised website is to take
control over the incoming web traffic originating from search re-
sults. This function—which we call, in short, hijacking—makes the
online criminals capable of directing the illicitly acquired web traffic
to the online pharmacies. On the technical level, this is accomplished
either through special directive injected in the configuration of the
web server software, or by injecting specially crafted JavaScript (JS)
and HTML functions into the compromised website(s).
Through the first method, the web server issues a HTTP 302 re-
direction, when the web traffic meets certain requirements based on
the attack variant. A HTTP 302 redirection will forward traffic to
another webpage. The requirements for redirection include an ap-
propriate referrer value (implicit redirection), or a click on an
embedded storefront (explicit redirection). Detecting this comprom-
ise requires auditing the web server configuration files and the out-
bound links. The second method accomplishes the same objective,
but through the injection of malicious JS libraries, which in turn
generate the appropriate HTML redirection code [52]. In this case,
the attacker manipulates certain broadly used JS libraries, and detec-
tion is more complicated.
Traffic redirection
At this stage, the online criminals can leverage their control over the
traffic targeting the compromised websites, and direct it to a destin-
ation of their choice, and, potentially, of their control. We have
identified two criminal methodologies to redirect traffic: (i) using
one or more traffic brokers that act as intermediate redirectors be-
fore reaching one or possibly more unlicensed pharmacies, and (ii)
without traffic brokers, redirecting traffic directly from compro-
mised websites to unlicensed pharmacies. Brokers are not used ex-
clusively to funnel traffic to unlicensed pharmacies, but they are also
rather an important resource for other types of gray online markets.
Leontiadis et al. [1] found that the vast majority of compromises
(74.9% on average) make use of one or more brokers to redirect
traffic to one or more pharmacies. “Dedicated brokers” that redirect
traffic to a single pharmacy (per broker) are 61.1% of the total, and
are linked to an average of 18.9 compromised URLs. On the other
hand, “shared brokers” being 33.8% of the total, redirect traffic to
2.8 pharmacies (per broker), and are linked to an average of 11.8 in-
fected URLs. Both types of traffic brokers enable the dynamic man-
agement of the pool of compromised websites, by making it possible
to redirect to an alternative pharmacy location, when the one previ-
ously used is taken down. Shared brokers can also distribute the hi-
jacked traffic to a large set of potential destinations, by allowing the
dynamic redirection of traffic to a different pharmacy location at
any point in time.
Script actions for unlicensed pharmacy operation
The procedural components of operating an unlicensed pharmacy
are shown in Fig. 2. These include identifying drug suppliers, select-
ing drugs for sale, defining the pricing strategy, deploying the phar-
macy website, receiving the web traffic, processing payments, and
shipping merchandise. This analysis is mainly based on the research
findings by Leontiadis et al. [50]. However, using findings from
related work, the payment processing [64, 65], and shipping infra-
structure [10] are also described.
Identifying drug suppliers
The drug suppliers are the entities responsible for producing and
providing the drug stock of online pharmacies. Each supplier can
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provide a diverse set of drugs, with distinct differences among them.
Therefore, the availability of drugs at the unlicensed online pharma-
cies can be an estimator of the number of available drug suppliers.
Empirical examination of the inventories of 256 unlicensed online
pharmacies using the search-redirection attack as their advertising
technique revealed concentrations of drug suppliers [50]. Overall,
50% of the pharmacies are linked to just eight drug suppliers.
However, this observation is not limited to the specific type of
unlicensed pharmacies. In the aforementioned work, Leontiadis
et al. [50] also examined a separate set of 256 pharmacies appearing
in a list of about 10 000 “not recommended” pharmacies, described
as such by the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy [25].
Pharmacies in that list lack any evidence of proper licensing, posing
a potential health risk to whomever choses to purchase drugs from
such businesses. In addition, pharmacy websites from this list use
various methods of advertising that rarely overlap with the advertis-
ing methods employed by the main set of 256 pharmacies in
Leontiadis et al.’s study. Nevertheless, the authors’ examination of
this additional set of pharmacies highlighted the presence of similar
concentrations. Similarly, Gelatti et al. [10], using a different meth-
odology, found that orders for prescription drugs placed at different
unlicensed online pharmacies, were fulfilled by a small, fixed set of
drug manufacturers.
Selecting drugs for sale
While an unlicensed online pharmacy may sell any possible subset of
the drugs available through its supplier, it is a for-profit business
operating in a shady environment. Therefore, it needs to be competi-
tive among its shady, as well as its legitimate, counterparts.
Unlicensed pharmacies can be competitive through a combination of
two strategies: drug selection and drug pricing. It is noteworthy that
licensed pharmacies are rarely able to engage in either strategy; they
must fill every prescription for any possible FDA approved drug,
and the amount of dispensed drug units is strictly defined in the pre-
scription. Examining more than 1.02 million drug combinations
that appear in 256 unlicensed pharmacies and one licensed online
pharmacy, Leontiadis et al. [50] identified the drug selection strat-
egies designed to achieve (i) greater variability of available drugs, (ii)
greater availability of drug with potency for abuse, and (iii) targeted
coverage of medical conditions that generate long-term profit from
drug sales.
Defining pricing strategies
The second marketing strategy revolves around drug pricing.
Generally, the pharmacy operators engage in a three-tiered ap-
proach that makes them competitive compared to licensed pharma-
cies [50]. Overall, they offer: (i) generally lower prices, (ii) fake
generics, and (iii) volume discounts. In addition, unlicensed pharma-
cies offer deep discounts for widely used drugs compared to the less
popular ones.
Deploying pharmacy websites
Online pharmacies are simply e-commerce websites that need to sat-
isfy two prerequisites in order to be operational: (i) host content on
a web server or at a web hosting provider and (ii) register a domain
name. Their choices in both accounts are essential for being and
staying operational. There are multiple ways to host a website.
These include utilizing a web hosting provider as a service, or setting
up a web server operated from a home or office. For more illicit op-
erations, botnets are commonly utilized to host the questionable
content [66]. Using a hosting provider is a common avenue both for
legitimate and illicit purposes. For the latter, online criminals can
benefit from the delayed—or complete lack of—response from ser-
vice providers to law enforcement requests for taking down illicit
content. That is especially important in cases where the time-to-
take-down is critical for the success of the criminal operation [67].
LegitScript and KnuJoN [68] reveal that domain name providers
(i.e. registrars) can also be considered as enablers of the operation of
unlicensed online pharmacies. Registrars have the legal authority to
discontinue the operation of domains engaged in illegal activities.
However, they do not always have the financial incentive to do so.
LegitScript and KnuJoN [68] found that four registrars, hosting the
majority of unlicensed pharmacies at the time, acted as “safe
havens” for these illicit operations, by ignoring requests for illicit
domain takedowns. Levchenko et al. [69] make similar observations
and highlight the capacity of criminals to exploit the systemic weak-
nesses to their benefit.
Receiving web traffic
Once the infrastructure and required collaborations are in place, the
online pharmacies are ready to handle incoming web traffic repre-
senting potential customers. Search-redirection attacks, as outlined
earlier, provide an illicit mechanism to receive web traffic, as indus-
try has effectively put a stop to legitimate advertising of unlicensed
pharmacies through search engines. Other vectors for traffic acquisi-
tion include email [51] and social networking spam [70]. A longitu-
dinal analysis of online pharmacies using search-redirection attacks
to attract potential customers has shown that a variety of ways to re-
ceive web traffic is used. These include using dedicated traffic bro-
kers, using shared traffic brokers, or not using a broker at all [50].
Processing payments
When customers complete their orders, payments are often pro-
cessed off-site through affiliate networks [65]. In addition, the pay-
ment processors, in 95% of cases, deliver the revenue through
popular payment networks such as Visa, MasterCard, and American
Express [64]. Generally, there are five parties involved in each trans-
action: (i) the cardholder who issues the payment (i.e. the customer),
(ii) the issuing bank (i.e. the customer’s bank), (iii) the payment net-
work (e.g. Visa), (iv) the acquiring bank (i.e. the merchant’s bank),
and (v) the merchant, who receives the payment. McCoy et al. [65]
and Levchenko et al. [69] have identified that the acquiring banks
are the most crucial component in the payment infrastructure. Only
a small number of them are willing to accept the risk of processing
high-risk transactions for online pharmaceuticals, especially when
there is increased pressure from the payment networks targeting
those transactions.
Shipping the merchandise
LegitScript and KnuJoN [71] attempted to evaluate the legitimacy of
online pharmacies advertising through search engines by placing a
number of orders for prescription drugs. They found that drugs are
shipped directly from the suppliers located mainly in India (via
Barbados and Singapore, and packaged in Turkey), in violation of
federal laws. More recently, Gelatti et al. [10] performed a similar
analysis, ordering prescription drugs online, and having them
shipped to Italy. They similarly found that, where the information
was available, India was the main origin of the received packages.
Other locations of origin included Turkey, the UK, and Vanuatu.
Both analyses point to the fact that online pharmacies ship their
merchandise through international locations, in order to exploit the
well-established jurisdictional (e.g. [12]) and policing (e.g. [31])
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limitations. In addition, they present no indication that any of the
orders placed originated from within the USA.
Situational crime prevention measures targeting
search-redirection attacks
We examine situational crime prevention measures capable of af-
fecting the criminal opportunities for engaging in search-redirection
attacks. This examination is performed from two distinct perspec-
tives: before and after the occurrence of website compromise, which
facilitates the illicit operation. We make this distinction as the situ-
ational measures affect distinctly different opportunities at each
stage. Measures targeting the infrastructure of traffic brokers are
also considered.
Measures applicable “before” website compromise
The situational measures in this category are specifically designed to
prevent the compromise of vulnerable websites.
Utilize webmasters for website hardening. The vulnerable websites
are the main driving force of this type of illicit advertising.
Therefore, providing proper incentives or education to website own-
ers in keeping their web space secure would effectively reduce the
target availability. This would consequently increase the efforts
required by the online criminals to succeed in their illicit goals.
Considering the expected lack of interest of webmasters in imple-
menting security countermeasures [72], such incentives would
need to highlight the mandatory nature of taking action in this
direction—e.g. by imposing fines.
CMS and web server hardening. Certain aspects of CMSs enable
website compromises. We note the argument that hiding the version
information of the CMS being used can reduce the potential for
compromise [73]. However, this argument not only lacks empirical
support [57], but it also interferes with the maintenance efforts of
web administrators [54]. Instead, incentives for adequate penetra-
tion testing [74, 75], and inclusion of self-updating mechanisms that
fix identified vulnerabilities could reduce the number of compro-
mised websites. In addition, vulnerability reward programs are a
cost-effective method for fixing software problems, especially when
they are appropriately structured to provide rewards proportional to
the severity of identified problems [76]. In essence, vulnerability re-
ward programs provide incentives for independent researchers to
discover and submit vulnerabilities to the respective software ven-
dors in exchange for monetary rewards, instead of selling this infor-
mation to the black market.
Utilize search engines to increase the effort and risks of compromise.
Search engines are a key facilitator of this criminal operation, and
can be utilized in a number of ways to deflect offenders, conceal vul-
nerable websites, extend guardianship for high-value targets, and re-
duce anonymity for suspect queries.
In relation to deflecting offenders, the use of search engines by
offenders to identify vulnerable websites can be thwarted through
the active identification and blocking of queries capable of revealing
possible target websites from the search engines. Vulnerable web-
sites can be concealed using the same methods as the offenders for
identifying vulnerable websites (i.e. queries). Search engines can
completely remove such websites from their indexes or decrease
their ranking while they remain vulnerable. In terms of the latter
type of action, Edwards et al. [77] suggest that search engines can
prevent the spread of hosted infections by demoting—or
“depreferencing”—compromised websites. While their analysis cov-
ers websites that are—potentially—already compromised, the pre-
dictive power of the methodology suggested by Soska and Christin
[58] may provide an effective approach to conceal vulnerable web-
sites with high potential for compromise.
High-value targets for website compromise include those that
have a high ranking in search results. Search engines have the cap-
acity to extend guardianship for such targets by taking routine pre-
cautions to identify vulnerabilities and attempts for compromise at
these locations. Finally, anonymity for suspect queries could be
reduced by permitting target-revealing queries only for users that
have been authenticated (i.e. signed-in), while blocked for mischiev-
ous purposes for anonymous users.
Measures applicable “after” website compromise
Once a website has been compromised, resulting in search engine
manipulation, the effort of the following situational measures shifts
towards reducing the rewards to the offenders.
Utilize search engines to conceal victimized targets. Search engines
can reduce the benefits of compromise, by first detecting and then
removing or depreferencing compromised websites. Based on the at-
tack variant, The heuristics to detect compromise are cloaking and
injected storefront detection. The second heuristic can be imple-
mented either through link analysis, as demonstrated in Leontiadis
et al. [50], or by identifying unexpected content, considering the his-
torical profile of the investigated websites.
Utilize webmasters to identify compromise. Webmasters should
have the proper incentives (e.g. accountability), and receive proper
education and assistance to regularly maintain and monitor their on-
line property for indicators of compromise. This would be a distrib-
uted effort toward effectively stopping traffic redirection to
malicious destinations.
Measures disrupting traffic brokers
The majority of the compromised websites, victims of the search-
redirection attack, are linked to traffic brokers [1]. Therefore, these
actors represent an important part of the criminal infrastructure.
Crime prevention measures that can disconnect the traffic brokers
from the rest of the criminal infrastructure may have significant dis-
ruption effects [obviously, whenever traffic brokers are not used for
traffic redirection, such measures are irrelevant, and the focus
should then be on the appropriate points of the criminal operations
instead (e.g. through search engine intervention)] . The Internet ser-
vice providers and the domain registrars, being the “place man-
agers” that facilitate the operation of brokers—by providing them
with IP addresses and domain names—meet this operational require-
ment. An intervention at this level would result in an increase in the
operational risk (by increasing the possibility of punishment), and
the efforts of criminals (by making it harder to find a “friendly”
hosting provider). While offenders may displace to “bulletproof”
hosting providers, these are generally more expensive, reducing the
overall profit margin for offenders.
It is important to note that before making a request to the service
providers to discontinue the services and resources of brokers, there
is a need for empirically based investigative work for the proper
identification of the traffic brokers. Leontiadis et al. [1] provide
well-defined methodologies capable of meeting this requirement,
and identifying the few Internet service providers and domain regis-
trars that support the operation of traffic brokers.
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Situational crime prevention measures targeting
unlicensed online pharmacies
The situational prevention measures targeting the operation of un-
licensed online pharmacies are inherently divided in four categories.
These include measures that limit the supply of prescription drugs,
measures that affect the availability of pharmacy websites, measures
that prevent or reduce the network traffic reaching operational
pharmacies, and measures that interfere with the processing and ful-
fillment or orders placed at unlicensed pharmacies.
Measures limiting prescription drug supply
Measures that reduce the availability of illicit prescription drugs in-
clude increasing the risk of operating drug labs and enabling trace-
ability of precursor chemicals and specialized equipment. These
should have a severe effect on the operation of unlicensed pharma-
cies and the financial benefits for online criminals.
Engage society to increase risk of apprehension. Chiu et al. [41] rec-
ommend, in relation to laboratories manufacturing methampheta-
mine, that the public should be encouraged to make reports to the
police about their location. Given the small number of prescription
drug manufacturing labs, an extension of this countermeasure is to
provide monetary incentives to report their operation. These incen-
tives should exceed the expected revenue of the criminal operations,
to minimize the potential of bribery. The effectiveness of such meas-
ures can be significantly limited if a lab operates in a lawful context,
but employees manage to illicitly acquire and sell certain portions of
the legally produced drugs, or if the criminal groups controlling the
operation of labs are able to provide much stronger—financial or
otherwise—incentives to deter potential whistleblowers.
Enable traceability of precursor chemicals. Enabling proper identifi-
cation of the well-known set of chemicals used to produce counter-
feit drugs, can allow tracing of confiscated drugs back to their
producers [78]. This action would potentially increase the risks asso-
ciated with access to these chemicals, and the costs of illicit drug
manufacturing.
Enable traceability of specialized equipment. Being able to identify
the owners of specialized equipment used only for production of
prescription drugs would result in an increase in the effort of pro-
ducing the illicit substances, a subsequent increase in the operational
costs, and an overall increase in the risk of apprehension [41].
Considering the small number of “large players” who manufacture
the majority of illicitly traded drugs—eight in total associated with
50% of online pharmacies [50]—these measures have the potential
to be highly effective.
Measures affecting the availability of pharmacy websites
The operation of unlicensed pharmacies has similar characteristics
as the traffic brokers discussed earlier. Therefore, requesting the do-
main registrars to disrupt the operation of online pharmacies by the
provision of services is also applicable in the present discussion.
Measures reducing potential customers
Methods to disrupt the criminal infrastructures sending traffic to un-
licensed pharmacies through the search-redirection attack are out-
lined in the previous section. However, as it is noted elsewhere,
unlicensed pharmacies also attract potential customers through or-
ganic search results and email spam. Existing mechanisms to disrupt
these methods include search engines excluding such results [16],
and the enforcement of email blacklists [79]. However, alternative
measures explored here are aimed at reducing the likelihood that
consumers will choose to visit unlicensed pharmacies by educating
them about the potential health impacts and providing affordable
health care through legitimate means.
Educate consumers. While it is well documented that drugs pur-
chased online from unlicensed pharmacies can have severe effects on
the health of consumers [13, 14], even people with medical know-
ledge are evidently unaware of those risks [5], or they choose to ig-
nore such risks for various reasons (e.g. reduced cost, lack of
medical insurance) [6, 12]. Therefore, large-scale campaigns provid-
ing information about the pitfalls of purchasing drugs online from
questionable locations (e.g. [80]) can potentially protect consumers
and reduce the profitability of unlicensed pharmacies.
Provide low-cost health care. Providing low-cost health care is
aimed at improving public health and access for those on low in-
comes [81]. In relation to the illicit online prescription drug trade,
the availability of affordable medicine is a potential countermeasure
to prevent those with health problems resorting to online sales for fi-
nancial reasons [16]. However, providing low-cost health care is a
much debated and tedious task, and recent efforts in this direction
[82] are to be evaluated for their long-term effectiveness.
Measures affecting orders placed at unlicensed pharmacies
The purpose of situational measures in this category is to prevent
the processing of payments at unlicensed online pharmacies, and the
delivery of their illicit goods.
Deny payments. Payments networks (e.g. Visa) that process credit
card payments, have the potential to identify transactions benefiting
unlicensed pharmacies, and force merchant banks—through finan-
cial disincentives—to sever their business relationships with the il-
licit pharmacy operators. In this case, there are limited options for
the latter party to overcome this hurdle. For example, the offending
merchants may have to use an alternative acquiring bank, which is
not always an option. Also, the merchants may have to fraudulently
mislabel the transactions (as non-drug related), in order to avoid de-
tection, by the payment networks. It has been shown that measures
in this direction can financially stifle offending enterprises, and pro-
vide counter-incentives for banks to cooperate with the online crim-
inals [65]. It is noted that online pharmacies may displace their
payment methods to accept digital currencies, such as Bitcoin.
Disrupt the market by confiscating illicitly imported drugs.
Extensive inspection of packages received at international ports of
entry under the jurisdiction of US CBP from locations known to ship
the illicit merchandise may have a dual effect. While protecting cus-
tomers from potential health risks [10, 13, 14], this intervention will
also cause substantial financial loss to criminals through the unsatis-
fied requests of refunds from customers [65].
Discussion on the efficacy of suggested
situational measures
The previous sections examined in detail the criminal processes
enabling the illicit online prescription drug trade, namely search-
redirection attacks and the operation of unlicensed pharmacies. This
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CSA is based on empirical examination and measurements of the il-
licit operations, and it provides an understanding of the online crim-
inal infrastructures and the interactions among their components.
The CSA then informed the subsequent identification of situational
prevention measures capable of increasing the criminal efforts and
risks in engaging is such activities, while concurrently reducing the
associated criminal profits.
In a version of the world where infinite resources were available
to combat the problem of illicit online pharmacies, we would not
need to worry about the effectiveness of these recommendations per
unit of cost. However, implementing all aforementioned measures in
the present version of the world that includes multiple stakeholders,
opportunity costs, and individual agendas, we need to consider the
feasibility of each of those measures.
Leontiadis’ [83] approach in evaluating situational prevention
measures is through a “complexity-effectiveness” analysis, which can
be considered as the non-monetary equivalent of a cost–benefit ana-
lysis. Leontiadis defines the complexity of a situational prevention
measure as the estimated number of actors participating or implement-
ing the measure. In addition, he defines effectiveness as the estimated
reduction of criminal activity, at a given level of complexity.
For example, this research identifies a small number of actors,
relative to the overall number of pharmacies, that if targeted may
have a disproportionately large effect on the operation of other areas
of the illicit online pharmacy trade. These actors are the drug manu-
facturers, eight of whom supply half of the online pharmacies, and
the traffic brokers, who funnel redirected traffic to unlicensed phar-
macies. Hence, a complexity-effectiveness analysis of measures tar-
geting these actors would reveal them as being a rather good choice
for an intervention. This is similar to the findings of Morselli and
Roy [44] who identified key brokers whose removal would result in
a significant disruption to the stolen-vehicle market.
Applying this type of analysis to search engines and payment sys-
tems, we arrive to similar conclusions. Search engines enable online
criminals in terms of identifying their victims (e.g. vulnerable web-
sites), and of funneling web traffic into illicit businesses. Further on
payment networks allow online criminals to monetize this stream of
potential customers, giving them further incentive to continue oper-
ating their illicit business. Both types of actors share important char-
acteristics. They are limited in number (at least the most popular
ones), and they are overly important for the function of the illicit op-
erations. These characteristics make them very effective whenever
they take an action that limits the opportunities for offending.
Search engines and payment networks are therefore, in a sense, part
of the critical infrastructure of these online crimes.
However, when assessing the effectiveness of the various service
providers, we can see how much less effective they can be. These ser-
vice providers enable online criminal activity by providing necessary
resources, such as Internet locations (i.e. websites). However, this
group of actors is greater in numbers, and while specific actors may
be more powerful in terms of their market share, we cannot argue
that employing only the specific subset of actors for implementing a
set of countermeasures will have similar effectiveness as with, e.g.
search engines. In such case, online criminals can displace to a differ-
ent service provider and continue with their illicit operation.
Concluding remarks
Contrary to traditional crime, the characteristic features of online
crime often make it immune to traditional intervention approaches
that would normally act as deterrents. Specifically, it is performed
within a globalized virtual environment, the Internet, which allows
for a certain degree of anonymity—or at least perceived anonymity.
In this case, anonymity enables miscreants to profit illicitly or
fraudulently without the fear of attribution, prosecution, and pun-
ishment [84]. In addition, even when a criminal action can be attrib-
uted to specific actor(s), jurisdictional complications often allow
such actions to remain unpunished.
The global scale of online criminal operations is evidently a sig-
nificant hardship from the perspective of law enforcement.
International cooperation is necessary for targeting criminal oper-
ations taking place beyond the jurisdiction of the victimized popula-
tion. However, while these are online crimes, there is a strong
physical component, and it is the drug manufacturing stage that ar-
guably poses the greatest risk in terms of targeted and informed law
enforcement action. Online criminals may have the incentive to di-
versify the physical locations of their infrastructures, whenever this
is applicable. However, physical relocation of the resources required
to manufacture drugs for sale may impose a significant financial
burden to online criminals.
Historically, the different components of online crime have been
targeted in isolation, either by law enforcement, or through tech-
nical solutions. This approach has only short-term or superficial ef-
fects, as it usually does not affect the critical components of the
criminal infrastructures. The overall problem is not that there is no
incentive to target those components, but the fact that they often re-
quire complex methods to bring them out of obscurity. The method-
ology we suggest here takes instead an empirical approach in
studying online crime, looking for the processes most vulnerable to
intervention.
The methodological approach taken in this work provides an
understanding of the structure of online criminal networks, identi-
fies the associated critical resources providing opportunities to profit
illicitly, and provides points for intervention using situational crime
prevention. Measures that lack empirical support, or that do not,
target critical resources are often futile. We argue that policy makers
and technology providers need to work in tandem to get the upper
hand in disrupting online crime. In addition, through this work, we
suggest that the research community engaged in measurements of
online crime can receive significant gains by combining their work
with well-established concepts from different scientific domains.
Indeed, this article applies traditional criminological crime preven-
tion concepts, and effectively adapts them to the unique characteris-
tics of digital crime.
Conflict of interest statement. None declared.
Funding
This work was supported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Science and Technology Directorate, Cyber Security Division (DHSS&T/
CSD) Broad Agency Announcement 11.02; the Government of Australia; and
SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific [contract number N66001-13-C-0131].
Acknowledgments
The work would not have been possible without the invaluable assistance
of Nicolas Christin, Tyler Moore, Alfred Blumstein, Pedro Ferreira,
Richard Clayton, and Ross Anderson. We also thank the two anonymous re-
viewers whose comments and suggestions helped improve and clarify
this manuscript. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations
expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the aforemen-
tioned agencies.
90 Journal of Cybersecurity, 2015, Vol. 1, No. 1
 by guest on January 20, 2016
http://cybersecurity.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
References
1. Leontiadis N, Moore T, Christin N. Measuring and analyzing search-redirec-
tion attacks in the illicit online prescription drug trade. In: Proceedings of the
20th USENIX Security Symposium, San Francisco, 2011.
2. Cornish DB. Crimes as scripts. In: Proceedings of the International Seminar
on Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis. Tallahassee, 1994.
3. Cornish DB. The procedural analysis of offending and its relevance for
situational prevention. In: Clarke RV (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies.
Monsey: Criminal Justice Press, 1994, 151–96.
4. Leontiadis N, Moore T, Christin N. A nearly four-year longitudinal study
of search-engine poisoning. In: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, Scottsdale, 2014.
5. Ivanitskaya L, Brookins-Fisher J, O’Boyle I et al. Dirt cheap and without
prescription: how susceptible are young US consumers to purchasing
drugs from rogue Internet pharmacies? J Med Internet Res 2010;12:E11.
6. Henney JE, Shuren JE, Nightingale SL et al. Internet purchase of prescrip-
tion drugs: buyer beware. Ann Internal Med 1999;131:861–62.
7. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-84/pdf/STATUTE-84-Pg1236.pdf.
8. Castronova JR. Operation Cyber Chase and other agency efforts to con-
trol Internet drug trafficking the “virtual” enforcement initiative is virtu-
ally useless. J Leg Med 2006;27:207–24.
9. Beccaria C. Dei delitti e delle pene (On crimes and punishments): Il Caffe`,
1764.
10. Gelatti U, Pedrazzani R, Marcantoni C et al. You’ve got m@il: Fluoxetine
coming soon!’: accessibility and quality of a prescription drug sold on the
web. Intl J Drug Policy 2013;24:292–401.
11. Wilson T. Researchers link storm botnet to illegal pharmaceutical sales.
2008. http://www.darkreading.com/researchers-link-storm-botnet-to-illegal-
pharmaceutical-sales/d/d-id/1129540 (19 October 2015, date last accessed).
12. Henney JE. Cyberpharmacies and the role of the US Food and Drug
Administration. J Med Internet Res 2001;3:E3.
13. Bessell TL, Anderson JN, Silagy CA et al. Surfing, self-medicating and
safety: buying non-prescription and complementary medicines via the
Internet. Qual Safety Health Care 2003;12:88–92.
14. Bessell TL, Silagy CA, Anderson JN et al. Quality of global e-pharmacies:
can we safeguard consumers? Eur J Clin Pharmacol 2002;58:567–72.
15. Orizio G, Merla A, Schulz PJ et al. Quality of online pharmacies and web-
sites selling prescription drugs: a systematic review. J Med Internet Res
2011;13:e74.
16. Liang BA, Mackey T. Searching for safety: addressing search engine, web-
site, and provider accountability for illicit online drug sales. Am J Law
Med 2009;35:125–84.
17. Littlejohn C, Baldacchino A, Schifano F et al. Internet pharmacies and on-
line prescription drug sales: a cross-sectional study. Drugs Educ
Prevention Policy 2005;12:75–80.
18. United States Congress House. In: Proceedings of Congress and General
Congressional Publications. Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 2002.
19. Eckholm E. Abuses are found in online sales of Medication. New York
Times, July 9, 2008.
20. LegitScript. Setting the record straight. n.d. http://www.legitscript.com/
about/setting-the-record-straight (10 June 2015, date last accessed).
21. Miller CC. Google is said to have broken internal rules on drug ads. 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/14/technology/14google.html (10 June
2015, date last accessed).
22. Office of the Deputy US Attorney General. Google forfeits $500 million
generated by online ads & prescription drug sales by Canadian online
pharmacies. 2011. http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/google-forfeits-500-mil
lion-generated-online-ads-prescription-drug-sales-canadian-online (10
June 2015, date last accessed).
23. LegitScript. LegitScript: The leading source of Internet pharmacy verifica-
tion. n.d. http://www.legitscript.com/ (10 June 2015, date last accessed).
24. Taylor P. Microsoft, Yahoo follow Google in fight against rogue online
pharmacies. 2010. http://www.securingindustry.com/pharmaceuticals/
microsoft-yahoo-follow-google-in-fight-against-rogue-online-pharmacies/
s40/a501/ (18 June 2015, date last accessed).
25. National Association of Boards of Pharmacy. Not recommended sites.
2014. http://www.nabp.net/programs/consumer-protection/buying-medi
cine-online/not-recommended-sites/ (10 June 2015, date last accessed).
26. United States 106th Congress Senate Committee on Health E, Labor and
Pensions. E-drugs: Who Regulates Internet Pharmacies? Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000.
27. US Department of Justice. International Internet drug ring shattered.
2005. http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr042005.html (10 June
2015, date last accessed).
28. US Department of Justice. Operation Cyber X Press Conference. 2005.
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr092105b.html (10 June 2015,
date last accessed).
29. Interpol. Pharmaceutical crime: Operations. 2014. http://www.interpol.
int/Crime-areas/Pharmaceutical-crime/Operations/ (10 June 2015, date
last accessed).
30. Moore T, Clayton R. The impact of incentives on notice and take-down.
In: Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, Hanover, 2008.
31. United States 107th Congress House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations. Continuing Converns over Imported Pharmaceuticals.
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001.
32. US Food and Drug Administration. Imported drugs raise safety concerns.
2011. http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143
561 (10 June 2015, date last accessed).
33. United States 118th Congress Senate Subcommittee on Investigations.
Buyer Beware: The Danger of Purchasing Pharmaceuticals over the
Internet. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004.
34. Kanich C, Kreibich C, Levchenko K et al. Spamalytics: an empirical ana-
lysis of spam marketing conversion. In: Proceedings of the 15th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. New York,
2008: 3–14.
35. Clarke RV, Cornish DB. Modeling offenders’ decisions: a framework for
research and policy. Crime Justice 1985;6:147–85.
36. Cornish DB, Clarke RV. Understanding crime displacement: an applica-
tion of rational choice theory. Criminology 1987;25:933–47.
37. Clarke RV. Situational crime prevention: its theoretical basis and practical
scope. Crime Justice 1983;4: 225–56.
38. Newman GR, Clarke RV. Superhighway Robbery: Preventing
E-commerce Crime. Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003.
39. Felson M, Clarke RV. Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for
Crime Prevention. London: Home Office, 1998.
40. Smith RG, Wolanin N, Worthington G. e-Crime Solutions and Crime
Displacement. Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 243.
Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003.
41. Chiu YN, Leclerc B, Townsley M. Crime script analysis of drug manufac-
turing in clandestine laboratories: implications for prevention. Br J
Criminol 2011;51:355–74.
42. Lacoste J, Tremblay P. Crime and innovation: a script analysis of patterns
in check forgery. Crime Prevention Stud 2003;16:169–96.
43. Levi M, Maguire M. Reducing and preventing organised crime: an
evidence-based critique. Crime Law Soc Change 2004;41:397–469.
44. Morselli C, Roy J. Brokerage qualifications in ringing operations.
Criminology 2008;46:71–98.
45. Hancock G, Laycock G. Organised crime and crime scripts: prospects
for disruption. In: Bullock K, Clarke RV, Tilley N (eds), Situational
Prevention of Organised Crimes. Devon: Willan Publishing, 2010, 172–92.
46. Willison R. Understanding the perpetration of employee computer crime
in the organisational context. InformOrgan 2006;16:304–24.
47. Hutchings A, Holt TJ. A crime script analysis of the online stolen data
market. Br J Criminol 2015;55:596–614.
48. Lavorgna A. The online trade in counterfeit pharmaceuticals: new criminal
opportunities, trends and challenges.Eur J Criminol 2015;12:226–41.
49. Savona EU. Infiltration of the public construction industry by Italian
organised crime. In: Bullock K, Clarke RV, Tilley N (eds), Situational
Prevention of Organized Crimes. Collumpton: Willam Publishing, 2010,
130–50.
50. Leontiadis N, Moore T, Christin N. Pick your poison: pricing and invento-
ries at unlicensed online pharmacies. In: Proceedings of the Fourteenth
ACMConference on Electronic Commerce, Philadelphia, 2013.
Journal of Cybersecurity, 2015, Vol. 1, No. 1 91
 by guest on January 20, 2016
http://cybersecurity.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
51. Pitsillidis A, Kanich C, Voelker GM et al. Taster’s choice: a comparative
analysis of spam feeds. In: Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on
Internet Measurement Conference, New York, 2012, 427–40.
52. Li Z, Alrwais S, Wang X et al. Hunting the red fox online: understanding
and detection of mass redirect-script injections. In: Proceedings of the
35th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Jose, 2014.
53. Long J. Google Hacking for Penetration Testers. Burlington: Syngress,
2011.
54. Moore T, Clayton R. Evil searching: Compromise and recompromise of
Internet hosts for phishing. In: Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Workshop, Barbados, 2009.
55. Floreˆncio D, Herley C. Where do all the attacks go? In: Schneier Bs (ed.),
Economics of Information Security and Privacy. New York: Springer,
2013, 13–33.
56. Camp LJ, Lewis S. Economics of Information Security. Norwell: Springer,
2004.
57. Vasek M, Moore T. Identifying risk factors for webserver compromise. In:
18th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data
Security, Barbados, 2014.
58. Soska K, Christin N. Automatically detecting vulnerable websites before they
turn malicious. In: 23rd USENIX SECURITY Symposium, SanDiego, 2014.
59. Rapid7. World’s most used penetration testing software. 2014. http://
www.metasploit.com/ (10 June 2015, date last accessed).
60. Gyo¨ngyi Z, Garcia-Molina H. Link spam alliances. In: Proceedings of the
31st International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, Trondheim,
Norway, 2005.
61. Google. Cloaking. 2014. https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/
66355 (10 June 2015, date last accessed).
62. Microsoft. Bing Webmaster Guidelines. 2014. http://www.bing.com/web-
master/help/webmaster-guidelines-30fba23a (10 June 2015, date last
accessed).
63. Yahoo! Content quality guidelines. 2014. https://help.yahoo.com/kb/
search/content-quality-guidelines-sln2245.html (10 June 2015, date last
accessed).
64. McCoy D, Pitsillidis A, Jordan G et al. Pharmaleaks: understanding the
business of online pharmaceutical affiliate programs. In: Proceedings of
the 21st USENIX Conference on Security Symposium, Berkeley, 2012.
65. McCoy D, Dharmdasani H, Kreibich C et al. Priceless: the role of pay-
ments in abuse-advertised goods. In: Proceedings of the 2012 ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Raleigh, 2012.
66. Nadji Y, Antonakakis M, Perdisci R et al. Beheading hydras: performing
effective botnet takedowns. In: Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer & Communications Security, Berlin, 2013.
67. Moore T, Clayton R. Examining the impact of website take-down on
phishing. In: Proceedings of the Anti-Phishing Working Groups 2nd
Annual eCrime Researchers Summit, Pittsburgh, 2007.
68. LegitScript, KnuJoN. Rogues and registrars. 2010. http://www.legitscript.
com/download/Rogues-and-Registrars-Report.pdf (10 June 2015, date
last accessed).
69. Levchenko K, Pitsillidis A, Chachra N et al. Click trajectories: end-to-end
analysis of the spam value chain. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, Oakland, 2011.
70. Grier C, Thomas K, Paxson V et al. @ spam: the underground on 140 char-
acters or less. In: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, Chicago, 2010.
71. LegitScript, KnuJoN. Yahoo! Internet pharmacy advertisements. 2009.
http://www.legitscript.com/download/YahooRxAnalysis.pdf (10 June
2015, date last accessed).
72. Herley C. So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejec-
tion of security advice by users. In: Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on
New Security Paradigms, Oxford, 2009.
73. Damron J. Identifiable fingerprints in network applications. USENIX;
login 2003;28:16–20.
74. Austin A, Williams L. One technique is not enough: a comparison of vul-
nerability discovery techniques. In: International Symposium on
Empirical Software Engineering andMeasurement, Alberta, 2011.
75. Finifter M, Wagner D. Exploring the relationship between Web applica-
tion development tools and security. In: USENIX Conference on Web
Application Development, Portland, 2011.
76. Finifter M, Akhawe D, Wagner D. An empirical study of vulnerability re-
wards programs. In: USENIX Security, Washington, D.C., 2013.
77. Edwards B, Moore T, Stelle G et al. Beyond the blacklist: modeling mal-
ware spread and the effect of interventions. In: Proceedings of the 2012
Workshop on New Security Paradigms, Bertinoro, Italy, 2012.
78. Morelato M, Beavis A, Tahtouh M et al. The use of forensic case data in
intelligence-led policing: the example of drug profiling. Forensic Sci Intl
2013;226:1–9.
79. Chachra N, Savage S, McCoy D et al. Empirically characterizing domain
abuse and the revenue impact of blacklisting. In: Workshop on the
Economics of Information Security, State College, 2014.
80. American Medical Association. Illicit online pharmacies resort to hacking
to gain customers. 2011. http://www.amednews.com/article/20110905/
business/309059964/7/pdf (10 June 2015, date last accessed).
81. Balabanova D, Mills A, Conteh L et al. Good health at low cost 25 years
on: lessons for the future of health systems strengthening. Lancet
2013;381:2118–33.
82. United States 111th Congress. The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2010.
83. Leontiadis N. Structuring Disincentives for Online Criminals. Pittsburgh:
Carnegie Mellon University, 2014.
84. Armstrong HL, Forde PJ. Internet anonymity practices in computer crime.
InformManag Comput Sec 2003;11:209–15.
92 Journal of Cybersecurity, 2015, Vol. 1, No. 1
 by guest on January 20, 2016
http://cybersecurity.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
